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BOOK REVIEW
COLLABORATION WITH TYRANNY IN RABBINIC LAW. By David Daube.'
London: Oxford University Press, 1965. Pp. 104. $2.40.
JEWISH LAW IN THE DIASPORA: CONFRONTATION AND
ACCOMMODATION. By Leo Landman.2 New York: Shulsinger Bros.
Inc., 1968. Pp. 223. $6.00.
THE IMPERATIVE OF RELIGIOUS LAW
First "the Nuremberg Trials" syndrome and now the Vietnam War,
together with other causes, have brought to the fore of the American
consciousness the problem of what the moral limitations may be upon
the legitimacy and potency of state law. It is a striking irony of modern
history that in this situation men and groups of currently
*'progressive" views, i.e., such as assert the ultimate primacy of ethical
commitments, generally tend to lack authorities, both institutional and
ideological, on which to rely for their protestations, because it was
almost exclusively they who, in modern times, insisted on the
secularization and relativization of society and values. Thus we see the
curious and pathetic spectacle of an increasing number of young
people, raised in a "liberal" cultural environment which prided itself
in its alienation from religion and absolute morality, face the
government with the claim that they must be exempt from at least
some of its laws "on religious (and/or moral) grounds." '3
1 Regius Professor of Civil Law, University of Oxford.
2. Professor of Rabbinics, Dropsie College for Hebrew and Cognate Learning.
3. For a good view of the confusing diversity that prevails among American legal thinkers, see
Freeman, Moral Preemption, 17 HAST. L.J. 425-71 (1966). The frightening disarray on this
question which prevails in international law is excellently analyzed in Lewy, Superior Orders,
Nuclear Warfare, and the Dictates of Conscience: The Dilemma of Military Obedience in the
Atomic Age. 55 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 3 (1961). And the jurisprudential brouhaha can be illustrated
by the opposition of Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REv.
593 (1958) and his German tradition of Radbruch, Max Weber, Kelsen, and Lask vs. R. HARE,
THE LAWFUL GOVERNMENT, PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS, AND SOCIETY 157-72 and Fuller, Positivism
and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REv. 630 (1958). Also Hart does
not deny that there is a "minimum content of natural law." H. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW
184-95 (1961). Indeed, despite all the talk of "legal positivism," this is also true of Kelsen. The
latter, too, stipulates a rational, natural "'Grundnorm" as "minimally necessary natural law"
to justify the idea of social contract and to provide a last resort for freedom and morality. H.
KELSEN, DIE PHILOSOPHISCHEN GRUNDLAGEN DER NATURRECHTSLEHRE UND DES RECHTS
POSITIVlSMus 67 (1928); Do Noachites Have to Believe in Revelation? (A Passage in Dispute
between Matmonides, Spinoza, Mendelosohn and Herman Cohen) A Contribution to a Jewish
Washington University Open Scholarship
104 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 1970: 577
This circumstance alone should suffice to induce us to take another
look at the relationship between positive law and ethics, and, certainly,
the state and religion most prominently claim to be spokesmen for
these two values.
There are at least two additional reasons why men of the law would
be well advised to look at these two books: 1) Americans almost
invariably discuss the relationship between "state and church" from
the perspective of the state; here they have a chance to study it from
the perspective of at least one religion; 2) in Western culture the entire
problem is almost always discussed in a limitedly Christian context,
and even when, rarely, Jewish considerations are adduced (by non-Jews
as much as by Jews) they turn out to be the political and social
concerns of modernized, acculturated Jews rather than the authentic
and authoritative legal sources of Judaism itself. These two books help
greatly in remedying this condition.
Landman's book has the advantages and disadvantages of having
started out as a Ph.D. dissertation, that is, it is a dry and rather
unimaginative compilation and historical ordering of a large body of
useful facts. It revolves around the fundamental legal dictum laid down
by the Babylonian Talmudic authority Samuel early in the third
century that "the law of the kingdom (i.e. the highest civil authority)
is (also religiously binding) law."' 4 This principle has never ceased to
be authoritative and operative for Jews. However, without the religious
qualifications attached to it either from the outset or in the course of
time, it could (as has been attempted a few times and as the author
rightly warns) lead to self-dissolution of religious law and its ethical
values by the wholesale and unlimited assimilation of all state laws. In
fact, Samuel's dictum has always been applicable only to civil law,
primarily tax and real estate questions, to which, later, commercial law
View of Natural Law, 52 JEWISH Q. REv. (1962) and 53 JEWISH Q. REv. 60-63 (1963). The issue
seems to be two-fold: 1) Hart thinks that it is practically more useful to subsume also
fundamentally evil enactments under the concept 'law" while others would disagree; 2) he derives
his "minimum natural law" from empirical nature (cf. his references to Hobbes and Hume,
LANDMAN at 254), whereas some regard such a procedure as rationalistic reductionism, which in
this connection, for one, turns out to be not so much self-fulfilling as self-defeating; for Hart does
not deny that certain positive laws should be disobeyed. H. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 203-
07 (1961). But it has become greatly more difficult, if not impossible, to determine what both
the rationale and the instances of such morally justified disobedience are. For a wild extrapolation
of Hart's "minimum natural law" to extraterrestrial creatures, cf. R. PUccErri, PERSONs-A
STUDY OF POSSIBLE MORAL AGENTS IN THE UNIVERSE 107-15 (1968).
4. The sources and details can also be conveniently found in 7 TALMUDIC ENCYCLOPEDIA
(Hebrew), cols. 295-308 (1956), though not historically analyzed as in LANDMAN.
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and contract came to be added. Even in this area the relevant laws had
to be "laws of the kingdom," not "laws of the king" or "fiats of the
kingdom,"-i.e. they had to be universally directed at all subjects,
based on established legal tradition, and for the common welfare;
otherwise they were "royal robbery" and could, if possible, be properly
evaded.
Perhaps the historically and jurisprudentially most interesting
implication of Landman's study-for which the author supplies a good
deal of information but which he does not himself really explicate,
because of an apparent lack of a penchant for conceptualization-is
precisely the ironic historical tragedy of which we spoke at the outset:
that "liberalism" proved to be ultimately suicidal. Samuel's dictum
was laid down in Babylonia, where the Jews lived in a foreign country
the legitimacy of whose government they accepted. 5 In the
contemporary Palestinian Talmud, on the other hand, and in
Palestinian Jewry neither Samuel's principle nor its concept arises,
clearly because there the Jews regarded the country as their own and
the occupying Roman or other government as illegitimate. The
Palestinian tradition, with its extreme waryness of civil government,
was perpetuated in earlier mediaeval North-European Jewry which
regarded itself as surrounded by an immoral society. Thus the Franco-
German 12th-century Rabbi Samuel ben Meir stipulated a social
contract theory of legitimate government and law under which
conquest could not be a source of legitimate sovereignty.6 In more
enlightened Spain, on the other hand, where, under Moslem reign, a
lot of cultural and political crossacculturation took place, the
Babylonian tradition was carried forward to the point where even
5. Although Landman does not like the historical explanation (LANDMAN at 19-22), his
refutation of it is unconvincing, and B. Bamberger's point, 54 CENTRAL CONFERENCE OF
AMERICAN RABIS YEARBOOK, INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND THE DEMANDS OF THE STATE: THE
POSITION OF CLASSICAL JUDAISM 9 (1944), especially his assimilation of Samuel's Persian
patriotism to his anti-messianism, is quite persuasive. Bamberger's view is strenghtened, at length,
in 2 J. NEUSNER. A HISTORY OF THE JEWS IN BABYLONIA (1966). Bamberger's view of the matter
fits the thesis here advanced.
6. Landman wrongly thinks that social contract theory of government is a thesis about history
(157). whereas in fact it is a normative, heuristic idea. I THE POLITICAL WRITINGS OF J.J.
ROSSEAU, Je cherche i droit et la raison et ne dispute pas des fails, 462 (C.E. Vaughan ed. 1915);
6 KANTS WERKE 380 (E. Cassirer ed. 1912). The contract is "by no means to be necessarily
assumed to be a fact-it is a mere idea of reason, which has, however, its undoubted (practical)
reality ... " E. CASSIRER, ROSSEAU, KANT, GOETHE (1945); W. HAENSEL, KANTS LEHRE VOM
WIDERSTANDSRECHT, Kant-Studien No. 60, 46-53 (1926); Schwartz, The Right of Resistance, 74
ETHICS 126 (1964).
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appointment of rabbis was ceded to the civil power. This tradition then
also entered Northern-European Jewry a little later when increasing
civil despotism made it quite necessary for survival to accept brute
might as right. And with 19th-century Jewish emancipation, in
Napoleon's "Sanhedrin," under German-Jewish and American
assimilation, the Babylonian-Spanish tendency to submit to civil
government made further tremendous headway. The ultimate tragico-
ironic result of this development was seen in one way when German
Jews were confronted with Nazi laws whose legitimacy they had in
principle trouble disputing and which intended their death and is seen
in another way when present-day young American Jews, together with
other Americans, vainly seek grounds for ethical objections to the
Vietnam War and the draft.
The conclusion that such an over-all analysis would seem to
constrain is that the self-assertion of regligious law and the strictest
limitation of state law are again called for under modern conditions.
Recent decisions of U.S. courts, especially rulings of the Supreme
Court concerning conscientious objections (though couched more in
individualistic and moralistic terms), also come to this effect.7
Landman himself, however, is much too much the product of the
unfortunate development *which we have described to commit himself
unambiguously to such a conclusion. He preaches a good deal of
"patriotism" s and had to write a separate article in which to come to
grips with the Vietnam War problematic.9
Therewith we arrive at the single fundamental and decisive limitation
on the principle that "the law of the land is the law" which has never
been disputed in all of Jewish history-that with respect to three sins,
idolatry, sexual immorality, and shedding of human blood, "one must
let oneself be killed rather than forced to commit" them.10 Landman
7. Cf. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
The struggle for religiotis liberty has through the centuries been an effort to accommodate
the demands of the State to the conscience of the individual. The victory for freedom of
thought recorded in our Bill of Rights recognizes that in the domain of conscience there
is a power higher than the State. Throughout the ages men have suffered death rather than
subordinate their allegiance to God to the authority of the State. Freedom of religion
guaranteed by the First Amendment is the product of that struggle.
Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 68 (1946).
8. LANDMAN at 21.
9. L. Landman, Law and Conscience: The Jewish View, 18 JUDAISM 17 (Winter 1969). Here
he rightly anchors conscientious objection in principle to Jewish law. Id. at 25-29. Nevertheless,
(sad to say to someone committed to the over-arching supremacy of ethico-religious law) he leaves
"the facts" of the Vietnam War open. Id. at 29.
10. BABYLONIAN TALMUD, FRAcTATE SANHEDRIN 74a.
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does not deal with this at all. It is, on the other hand, the entire subject
of Daube's study. The latter is in every way a different kind of book:
the distinguished Regius Professor of Civil Law in the University of
Oxford, Fellow of All. Souls College, and erudite historian of
comparative law, read the book as the Riddle Memorial Lectures at
the University of Newcastle on Tyne. He writes literately, wittily,
humanely, and though his is overtly an exercise in the reconstruction
of the history of legal texts and concepts and he carefully abstains from
moralizing about them, he clearly knows full well what the real issue
is, and no intelligent reader can in turn fail to grasp it.
There is no need here to rehearse the details or the history of Daube's
scholarly and perceptive investigation. Suffice it to summarize the
result: under the fundamental ethico-legal principle just quoted the
earliest stratum of Talmudic law (i.e. continuously valid Jewish law)
prescribed that an individual man was not to be surrendered to civil
authority for execution, even if this refusal entailed the death of the
entire community, unless he was specifically named rather than
anonymously chosen at random, and even this exception was not
acceptable under "the rule for the truly pious;" after the devastating
persecutions under Emperor Hadrian (c. 130 C.E.), for the sake of the
survival of the community, this prohibition was relaxed inasmuch as
individuals who were "legally deserving of the death penalty" anyway
were excepted. "Legally deserving of the death penalty" turns out to
be metaphoric. As Daube shows, a civil condemnation to death could
not be meant literally, since (a) it would defeat the entire purpose of
the Jewish law in question, and (b) Samuel's principle "was never
taken au pied de la lettre."' Jewish law itself, on the other hand, had
by that time defacto abolished capital punishment. With the experience
of the Nazi Holocaust and other modern practices of using hostages
in mind, Daube is not, however, ready to let it ride at that: "The
doctrine here combated is perhaps not yet so old and rooted that it
must count as Halakhah, as the valid law on the matter. Alternatively,
if it is too late to drop it, it should be subjected to very restrictive
interpretation."12
I1. D. DAUSE, COLLABORATION Wrrm TYRANNY IN RABBINic LAw 43-44 (1965).
12. D. DAUE, THE DEFENSE OF SUPI'OR ORDERS IN ROMAN LAW 23 (1956). Daube can find
additional support in the authoritative sources for his view. For example, whereas the original
Mishniac source only prohibits the surrender of a man if death awaits him, the Jerusalemite
commentary ad locum adds:
Even as one is not allowed to surrender a man unto death so also is one not allowed to
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Collaboration with Tyranny in Rabbinic Law is actually the Jewish
counterpart to Daube's earlier and equally civilized The Defence of
Superior Orders in Roman Law (Inaugural Lecture before the
University of Oxford), Oxford 1956. With the Eichman Trial and now
My Lai before our eyes, it is supremely important to note the decisive
difference between the Biblically inspired ethos discussed hitherto and,
on the other hand, the basic posture of the Greco-Roman mind and
Occidental ethics and law under the latter's influence. Daube shows
that there is a clear line from Aristotle who held that the slave who
murders on his master's order is not guilty,"3 through Cicero's
"metastatis," Le. an act under outside compulsion is regarded as not,
in any way, appertaining to the agent, to the Justinian Digest: "[h]e is
without blame . . . who is under the necessity of obeying."" Daube
concludes that in mediaeval times "Judeo-Christian concerns had to
humanize this" and says "[ihat in an epoch of increasing
regimentation the problem is as urgent as ever no one will deny. ''l
In view of all this evidence it is, the reviewer believes, correct to
speak of a dichotomy between the Biblical posture and the Greco-
Occidental one.'6 Even in the Christian world-view, strong forces
issuing from the latter are at work. The Protestant theologian Reinhold
Niebuhr, who, with his "neo-realism," has decisively influenced such
political thinkers and activists as Hans Morgenthau and Arthur
Schlesinger Jr., has taught that concrete political action must be a
"'prudent" adjudication between the absolute morality of the Sermon
on the Mount and the "proximate," realistic judgments in a real world
in the state of sinfulness. 7 This enabled his disciples, like Paul
surrender him unto other punishments, for (it is known that) once a man falls into the
hands of pagans these will never act compassionately toward him.
Even further, although it had originally been conceded that a woman might be surrendered for
immoral sexual purposes if, and only if, (a) she had been specifically named and (b) she was really
known to be a prostitute anyway, the Rashba (13th century) prohibits even this on the ground
that such a woman might, just at that time, be considering (!) mending her ways.
13. M. OSTWALD, (Aristotles) NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, book 5 129-30, 133-36 (1962).
14. It must be added in fairness that Stoic views, e.g. Seneca, took a different position. Cf. E.
Corwin, The "Higher Law" Background of American Constitutional Law, 42 HARV. L. REV.
149, 166 (1928) (and sources cited).
15. D. DAUBE, THE DEFENSE OF SUPERIOR ORDERS IN ROMAN LAW 24 (1956).
16. G. Lewy, Superior Orders, Nuclear Warfare, and the Dictates of Conscience: The Dilemma
of Military Obedience in the Atomic Age, 55 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 3, 5 (1961). The material shows
conclusively that also the Western democratic countries provided even verbally for disobedience
of immoral superior orders only as a ploy to enable them to put the Nazi war-criminals on trial.




Ramsey,"5 to develop a theory of "the just war," at least as causistic
as Roman-Catholic canon-law,' which, in effect, makes it virtually
impossible ever to protest in the name of religious ethics against any
state law. And even Ramsey is regarded by some as too moralistic. For
example, Joseph L. Allen of the Perkins School of Theology, Southern
Methodist University, asks:
"What if one must choose between the right to immunity of a handful
of persons, on the one hand, and the destruction of countless millions
of people, with all of whom we are in covenant under God, on the other?
How morally justified would one be in saying that although, tragically,
he unintentionally allowed the deaths of millions upon millions as
collateral damage, at least he did not commit murder by direct and
intentional attacks upon the innocent? In such .an extreme case it is not
as clear what one should do as Ramsey may assume." 2
Clearly there is need to revive the Judaic ethos also in the Christian
world. The counter-question to Allen's is the Talmudic: "Is your blood
redder than his?"' 2 Or in our language: a man, or any number of men,
must know when to be ready to die rather than commit murder,
regardless of any arithmetic calculations to which human life is not
susceptible.
*STEVEN S. SCHWARZCHILD
18. See, e.g.. P. RAMSEY, THE JUST WAR; FORCE AND POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITY (1968); cf.
N.Y. Times, Nov. 2, 1969, § 7, at 10, col. 3.
19. Wells, How Much Can 'The Just War' Justify?, 46(23) J. PHILOSOPHY 819 (1969).
20. 12(12) WORLDVIEW 16 (1969).
2 1. BABYLONIAN TALMUD. TRACTATE PASSOVER 25a.
22. D. DAURE, COLLABORATION WITH TYRANNY IN RABBINIC LAW 27 (1965).
* Professor of Judaic Studies, Washington University, St. Louis, Missouri.
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